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ABSTRACT   
The increasing ethnic heterogeneity that many societies are experiencing could be 
interpreted as a detrimental phenomenon, since empirical literature exists that indicates 
that higher levels of ethnic fractionalization induce higher levels of corruption. This 
paper aims to show the role of tolerance in overcoming this harmful effect of ethnic 
heterogeneity. To this end, a sample of 86 countries is tested for a positive association 
between ethnic fractionalization and corruption. It is then shown that tolerance offsets 
this effect through both direct and indirect effects on corruption. In order to analyse the 
indirect effects, the level of income and the freedom of the press are selected as 
channels, since these represent two determinants of corruption that are linked to 
tolerance.  
Moreover, tolerance and corruption have been modelled as composites. Consequently, 
Partial Least Squares path modelling (PLS-PM) has been used. For our sample, an index 
of tolerance towards immigrants and people of different race and an index of corruption 
are constructed, for which several sources are jointly utilised.  
Our results appear to indicate that the adverse effect of ethnic fractionalization on 
corruption is offset by tolerance, which reduces corruption not only directly but also 
indirectly through the level of income and the freedom of the press. 
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1 Introduction  
Empirical studies on the quality of institutions show that societies of a more 
heterogeneous nature, especially from an ethnic point of view, tend to present 
institutions with low levels of quality because ethnic favouritism leads to higher 
corruption. Politicians and bureaucrats may seek favour from certain groups, thereby 
inducing an inefficient allocation of resources (see Alesina and Ferrara 2005; Alesina et 
al. 2003; Mauro 1995; Papyrakis and Mo 2014; and references therein).  
This positive relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and corruption may lead to the 
conclusion that the arrival of immigrants, especially those of a race other than the 
majority, is detrimental to the quality of institutions and, in general, to the welfare of the 
receiving country. In fact, the growth of xenophobia in the world is alarming. Even in 
traditional European democracies, we are witnessing a strengthening of xenophobic 
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political parties that seek to limit European integration, in particular the free movement 
of citizens. 
Nevertheless, our societies are increasingly heterogeneous as a result of the growing 
migratory flows and this is a phenomenon that is here to stay. Hence, from the point of 
view of social welfare and social peace, combating the possible negative effects of 
ethnic heterogeneity appears as a pressing task for policy makers. This paper aims to 
contribute towards facilitating this task.  
According to Easterly et al. (2006), what matters for the quality of institutions is social 
cohesion, but, from our perspective, this should not be confused with uniformity or 
homogeneity. Our hypothesis is that social cohesion could be achieved in a 
heterogeneous society through tolerance. Thus, our goal is to show that tolerance 
towards immigrants and people of different race might help the integration of all 
members of a community, thereby overcoming any friction caused by heterogeneity due 
to migration, and contributing towards an improvement of institutional quality. Despite 
the vast literature concerning the social and economic impacts of tolerance (Berggren 
and Elinder 2012a, 2012b; Das et al. 2008; Florida 2003; Gani 2016; Lopes et al. 2011; 
Inglehart et al. 2008), to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies focusing on the 
links between tolerance and quality of institutions and the role of tolerance in offsetting 
the possible detrimental effects of ethnic heterogeneity.  
Therefore, on the one hand, the negative impact of ethnic heterogeneity on the quality of 
institutions is tested in terms of increasing corruption, as found in the previous 
literature. On the other hand, the effects of tolerance towards immigrants and people of 
different race on corruption are analysed in order to ascertain whether tolerance offsets 
the adverse effects of ethnic heterogeneity. We distinguish between direct and indirect 
effects that tolerance could exert through various channels. These channels are those 
determinants of institutional quality that are affected directly by tolerance. In particular, 
this study has chosen the level of income and the freedom of the press as potential 
mediators between tolerance and corruption. 
To achieve our goals, a sample that covers 86 countries is used. The selection of 
countries has been conditioned by the availability of data regarding tolerance. For the 
measurement of ethnic heterogeneity, as explained in Section 3, the index of ethnic 
fractionalization provided by Alesina et al. (2003) is employed.  
As a first step, tolerance and corruption have to be measured. Both of these variables 
have been modelled as composites, since they represent design constructs or artefacts, 
that is, they are variables that are products of theoretical thinking and consist of 
elementary components (Henseler 2017a). This fact has led us to use a component-
based structural equation model, namely Partial least Squares (PLS) (Tenenhaus 2008), 
which also allows us to test both the direct and indirect relationships between the 
variables of our model.  
With respect to tolerance, in order to measure the corresponding composite construct, 
several items are jointly exploited: elements from the World Values Survey (WVS) and 
the European Values Survey (EVS), and the component of tolerance to immigrants of 
the Social Progress Index. This joint exploitation is an innovation with respect to the 
previous literature. Hitherto, a large proportion of empirical studies concerning 
tolerance have used the percentage of different groups (foreigners, people of different 
races, religions or sexual orientations, etc.) on total population (Amores et al. 2016; 
Florida 2002, 2003; Gani 2016; Rao and Dai 2017) as a measure of tolerance. We 
consider that this percentage can give rise to erroneous conclusions since tolerance is an 
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attitude and therefore the fact that different groups of people live in the same territory 
does not necessarily imply that they respect each other. However, there are studies that 
exploit the WVS/EVS. In general, they analyse each item of the survey independently 
(Berggren and Elinder 2012a, 2012b, 2015; Corneo and Jeanne 2009; Melgar et al. 
2015) while a few studies have built a broader index of tolerance (Berggren and Nilsson 
2013; Das et al. 2008; Dima and Dima 2016; Florida and Tinagli 2004).  
Concerning the quality of institutions, our focus is on corruption as one of the main 
dimensions of institution quality. In order to construct an index of corruption, we have 
employed the Corruption Perception Index as published by Transparency International, 
and the Control of Corruption Index from the World Governance Indicators.  
As a second step, the channels through which tolerance could affect corruption are 
selected. To this end, those determinants of corruption that are also associated to 
tolerance have been chosen, as will be explained in Section 2. This has led to the 
selection of the level of income, measured in terms of the income per capita, and of the 
freedom of the press as mediators.  
The direct relationship between tolerance and corruption is then tested, as are the 
indirect relations between them through the two channels selected. Finally, we verify 
the role of tolerance in overcoming the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on corruption. 
We consider these results to be relevant, since it can be shown that heterogeneity in a 
community is not a problem with respect to corruption, since the key is the tolerance of 
the population towards heterogeneity. Moreover, there is a broad consensus on the 
negative effects of corruption on economic and social progress that supports the need 
for an effective fight against corruption. The determination of the elements that 
contribute towards its reduction will make this task easier.  
Our paper makes the following contributions with respect to the previous literature. On 
the one hand, it is proposed that the direct and indirect effects of tolerance on the quality 
of institutions, measured through the corruption dimension, may outweigh the negative 
effects of ethnic heterogeneity on the quality of institutions. In this respect, 
contributions are made to both the literature on the impacts of tolerance and to that on 
the determinants of corruption. On the other hand, a structural equation model is applied 
that enables us to construct a measure of tolerance towards immigrants and people of 
different race by exploiting several sources of information. The data corresponding to 
this new index of tolerance appears in Table A2 in the Appendix. Moreover, this 
methodology has rarely been applied in the analysis of the determinants of corruption, 
although it has been widely extended in other areas. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a review of the 
literature and the theoretical arguments upon which our model is based. Section 3 
describes the data and the methodology. Section 4 offers the results. Section 5 presents 
the main conclusions. Finally, Section 6 includes the discussion of the implications and 
limitations of this research. 
2 Literature review and theoretical arguments 
2.1. The relationship between ethnic fractionalization and corruption 
Since the work of Huntington (1968), the ever-increasing literature has striven to show 
a negative relationship between ethnic fractionalization and quality of institutions. 
Huntington argued that governments in countries with a more fractionalised population 
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tended to implement policies that benefitted the winning minority at the expense of 
those groups not represented in government.  
 
In this sense, La Porta et al. (1999) conclude, by employing the Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization index (ELF) provided by Taylor and Hudson (1972), that ethnic 
fragmentation is a determinant of the quality of institutions, while Mauro (1995) points 
out that increasing ethnic heterogeneity in a society gives rise to higher corruption 
because ethnic favouritism leads to the inefficient allocation of resources. Similar 
results with the ELF index are obtained by Easterly et al. (2006) and Aixalá and Fabro 
(2008). 
 
Moreover, Alesina et al. (2003) achieve the same conclusions with their own 
fractionalization index. In the same vein, Papyrakis and Mo (2014) find evidence of the 
negative impact of ethnic heterogeneity on the quality of institutions for 102 countries, 
using the ethnic fractionalization index constructed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2005). 
 
Given the above literature, and considering corruption as a proxy of the quality of 
institutions, we propose the first hypothesis: 
 
H1: There is a positive association between ethnic fractionalization and corruption 
 
Since globalization is an unavoidable process that makes societies increasingly 
heterogeneous, the contribution of this paper showing the role of tolerance in offsetting 
this association is crucial. 
 
2.2. The relationship between tolerance and corruption 
Tolerance is a social attitude towards diversity: it is a multifaceted concept linked to 
values such as openness, acceptance, social inclusion, and respect for diversity 
irrespective of likes and dislikes. 
Tolerant attitudes have major economic, social, political and institutional implications. 
Florida (2014), based on the Gallup survey, argues that one of the elements that best 
explains how people settle in certain places is openness (how welcoming a place is). 
Following this argument, Florida points out that, in environments of a more tolerant 
nature, there are fewer entry barriers, which allows the rise of a creative class that, in 
turn, promotes progress. Furthermore, tolerance by allowing the inclusion of all 
members of a society, reduces conflicts within said society, and improves social 
networks (Gani 2016), social capital (Das et al. 2008), and even the happiness of its 
members (Inglehart et al. 2008).  
Fewer studies have focused on political and institutional consequences. To the best of 
our knowledge, there are no empirical studies that explicitly analyse the association 
between tolerance and corruption. However, there are several arguments that may 
justify the existence of direct links between these two phenomena. 
Intolerance leads to the non-integration of the different groups which form society and 
this, in turn, can lead to them living in separate environments: segregated, in the words 
of Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011). These authors demonstrate that ethnic and 
linguistic segregation reduces the quality of the polity and policy-making. They argue 
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that segregation can lead to conflicts over the distribution and financing of public 
goods. Each group will push to achieve the goods that benefit itself even if that 
distribution is not the best option for the interest of the whole. Specifically, "ethnic 
parties" (parties whose basis is mostly or exclusively ethnic) and/or lobbies can arise 
with the objective of putting pressure on the government to guarantee the interests of 
the individual group. This situation can lead to the corrupt behaviour of groups that 
pursue their own interest. In the same vein, Banerjee and Pande (2007) show that voter 
ethnicization worsens the quality of politicians by increasing their propensity to engage 
in corrupt practices.  
Following these results, our hypothesis is that tolerance prevents segregation and ethical 
voting, even in a fractionalized society, thereby avoiding one of the triggers to higher 
corruption. Moreover, tolerance plays a key role in our societies, which are becoming 
increasingly heterogeneous due to the flows of migrants. Tolerance permits the 
integration of all the citizens regardless of their differences, and overcomes the negative 
effects of a fractionalized society on corruption found in the literature. 
These arguments lead us to propose our second hypothesis: 
H2: There is a negative association between tolerance and corruption 
In addition to these possible direct effects of tolerance on corruption, there could also be 
indirect effects through several channels, selected from the determinants of corruption. 
There is a vast literature concerning the determinants of corruption and, in general, on 
the quality of institutions. These determinants can be grouped into stable and changing 
determinants. On the one hand, stable determinants refer to: issues, such as the 
fractionalization of society (Alesina et al. 2003); historical factors, such as colonial and 
legal origin (Acemoglu et al. 2001; La Porta et al. 1999, respectively); geographical 
constraints (Auer 2013); and cultural features (Alesina and Giuliano 2015). On the other 
hand, changing determinants include social, economic and political factors (see Alonso 
and Garcimartín 2013; Treisman 2007; among others). Since stable determinants cannot 
be modified, our focus is on the group of changing determinants. From among these, 
level of income and freedom of the press have been chosen as channels, since they 
present clear relationships with both tolerance and corruption, as explained below.   
2.3. The mediating role of the level of income  
There are numerous theoretical and empirical studies in the scientific literature that have 
shown the association between tolerance and economic growth (such as Berggren and 
Elinder 2012a, 2012b; Das et al. 2008; Florida 2002, 2003, 2014; Florida and Tinagli 
2004; Gani 2016; Lopes et al. 2011). Most of these investigations are based on the 
thesis by Florida. In his work "The rise of the creative class", Florida (2002) argues that 
what he calls the 3Ts of economic development (Technology, Talent and Tolerance) 
collaborate towards the rise of the creative class, which in turn fosters innovation and 
economic progress. Tolerant environments are places of a more open and diverse nature, 
which "are likely to attract greater numbers of talented and creative people: the sort of 
people who power innovation and growth" (Florida 2003, p. 11). Florida and his co-
authors test this thesis for various tolerance indicators and in different environments, 
such as American cities (Florida 2002) and European countries (Florida and Tinagli 
2004).  
Although all previous studies support the relationship between tolerance and growth, 
not all find this relationship to be positive. Berggren and Elinder (2012a) introduce a 
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new and interesting point of view by arguing why different kinds of tolerance may have 
different effects. They assert that the thesis of Florida is possible but incomplete. 
Berggren and Elinder (2012a, p. 287) suggest that "tolerance can affect economic 
growth in three basic ways: first, by affecting others than those towards which tolerance 
is directed; second, by affecting the productivity and innovative capacity of the minority 
groups that become tolerated; and third, by affecting the generation and spread of new 
ideas and values". If the group of tolerant people, or the tolerated minority, or the new 
ideas that emerge are more talented, productive and innovative, then tolerance can have 
beneficial effects on growth. But if they are not more talented, productive and 
innovative, then growth will be slowed down. Berggren and Elinder find empirical 
evidence, from a sample of 54 countries, that tolerance towards race has a positive but 
non-significant relationship with growth.  
As far as the relationship between income and quality of institutions is concerned, then 
the association between lower corruption and higher economic development seems to be 
established in the literature (see Saha and Ali 2017; Treisman 2007; and the references 
therein).  
Following Alonso and Garcimartín (2013, p. 210), in our paper it is considered that a 
higher level of development provides the resources required to achieve better 
institutions, which are assumed to be more effective in curbing corruption.  
Based on the above, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
H3: There is a negative association between tolerance and corruption through the 
following channel: level of income 
2.4. The mediating role of the freedom of the press 
Despite the lack of explicit research on the role of tolerance in the freedom of the press, 
the links of tolerance with other aspects of the freedom of individuals have indeed been 
studied. In this respect, Inglehart et al. (2008) find that tolerance generates freedom of 
choice and Berggren and Nilsson (2013, 2014) demonstrate positive relationships 
between tolerance and market freedom. 
Moreover, intolerant societies tend to control information in order to limit the power of 
non-tolerated minorities and to justify their attitudes towards these minorities. Sandoval 
and Collins (2016) corroborate this fact by showing how a set of cultural indicators 
closely related to tolerance explains the differentials in freedom of the press. 
In contrast, the links between the freedom of the press and corruption have been 
extensively studied. Adsera et al. (2003), Brunetti and Weder (2003), Treisman (2007), 
Pellegrini (2011) and Dutta and Roy (2016) find that the freedom of the press helps 
fight against corruption.  
Based on the above, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
H4: There is a negative association between tolerance and corruption through the 
following channel: freedom of the press 
Finally, ethnic fractionalization is considered as a control variable of both mediators: 
level of income and freedom of the press. 
The following theoretical model (Figure 1) is proposed in order to test our hypotheses. 
 
7 
 
 
Fig. 1 Conceptual model of relationship between tolerance and corruption  
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Sample and Measures  
Table 1 provides a summary of all the variables included in the model, the index chosen 
for each variable, their acronyms, and the data source used. The descriptive statistic for 
the variables is summarized in the Appendix (Table A1).  
INSERT TABLE 1 
In order to test the existence of a relationship between tolerance and corruption, only 
those countries for which there is data available for all the variables have been 
considered. Therefore, in order to attain a wider sample of countries, the mean value of 
the variables for the period 2010-2014 have been used for the level of income, the 
freedom of the press and the two indices employed to construct the index of corruption, 
and, in order to obtain the index of tolerance, several waves of the World Value Survey 
and the European Value Survey have been employed, as explained below. Table A2 in 
the Appendix lists the 86 countries finally included. 
A description and justification can now be given for the variables used in our analysis 
and for the index chosen for each variable. 
3.1.1 Index of Ethnic Fractionalization (EF) 
In order to measure Ethnic Fractionalization, the index provided by Alesina et al. (2003) 
is used. This index measures the probability that two randomly selected people from a 
given country will not belong to the same ethnic group (Alesina et al. 2003, pp. 158-
159). The ethnicity index of Alesina et al. (2003) is available for 190 countries and it is 
referred to the early to mid-1990s.These authors consider that the ethnic 
fractionalization index can be assumed to be relatively stable over a 30-year horizon 
(Alesina et al. 2003, p. 160). 
a1
a2
b2
b1
H2(-) = c’
H3(-) = Tolerance à Level of income à Corruption = a1b1
H4(-) = Tolerance à Freedom of the press à Corruption = a2b2
Tolerance
Level of
income
Freedom of the 
press
Corruption
Ethnic 
fractionalization
H1(+)
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3.1.2 Tolerance (T) 
Opinion surveys are used as a source of information to measure tolerance towards 
immigrants and people of different race since this variable is a personal attitude and 
cannot be observed directly. 
Many empirical studies that have studied tolerance have approached this concept from a 
single item of the opinion polls (Berggren and Elinder 2012a, 2012b, 2015; Corneo and 
Jeanne 2009; Melgar et al. 2015); there are very few papers that have generated indices 
(Berggren and Nilsson 2013; Das et al. 2008; Dima and Dima 2016; Florida and Tinagli 
2004). Moreover, these few indices refer to the concept of social tolerance in a broad 
sense, in that they use different items to include tolerance towards different groups. 
In our work, a construct for tolerance towards immigrants and people of different race is 
built using 5 items from two different but complementary sources (Table 1). First, the 
latest waves of international value surveys, waves 5 and 6 of the World Value Survey 
(WVS), and wave 4 of the European Value Survey (EVS) are included, and second, the 
Gallup World Poll is then used. 
From the international value surveys, on the one hand, the items (1) Tolerance towards 
immigrants (VNEIGHINMIG) and (2) Tolerance towards other races (VNEIGHRACE) 
were constructed from the answer to the question: “On this list, there are various groups 
of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as 
neighbours?” We have specifically considered the percentage of population that makes 
no mention of “Immigrants/foreign workers” and “people of a different race”, 
respectively. The answers to this question have been extensively used in research on 
tolerance (Berggren and Elinder 2012a, 2012b; Berggren and Nilsson 2013; Corneo and 
Jeanne 2009; Das et al. 2008; Dima and Dima 2016; Florida and Tinagli 2004; Inglehart 
et al. 2008). 
On the other hand, and also from the opinion survey, the item (3) Children values 
(VCHILD) was constructed. To this end, following Berggren and Elinder (2015), 
Berggren and Nilsson (2013), Corneo and Jeanne (2009), and Das et al. (2008), data 
was collected on the percentage of the population that mentioned “Tolerance and 
respect for other people” in answer to the question: “Here is a list of qualities that 
children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be 
especially important?”  
The value survey was also employed to build the item (4) Immigrant Job 
(VPRIORITY), which reflected the percentage of the population that answered 
"neither" or "disagree" to the following statement: "When jobs are scarce, employers 
should give priority to people of this country over immigrants". It is important to 
include this item since unemployment situations can significantly lower the tolerance in 
attitudes towards immigrants (Melgar et al. 2015). 
Finally, Melgar et al. (2015) argue that direct questions regarding one's attitude towards 
tolerance can provoke inflated responses since it is a socially acceptable value. On this 
basis, the (5) Index Tolerance for Immigrants (TOLINMIG) produced by the Social 
Progress Imperative from Gallup World Poll is included. Specifically, data is obtained 
from the answers to the question: "Is the city or area where you live a good place or not 
to live for immigrants from other countries?" This item solves the aforementioned 
problem of exaggerated responses since it avoids asking directly for personal opinions. 
This index varies from 0 (minimum of tolerance) to 1 (maximum of tolerance).  
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3.1.3 Corruption (C) 
In this paper, we have focused on corruption since the reduction of corruption 
constitutes a key element for the improvement of the quality of institutions. It is 
commonly accepted that corruption is “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” 
(Transparency International 2017).   
In order to measure corruption, we have constructed an indicator from the two most 
widely used indicators.
1
 On the one hand, the (1) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
provided by Transparency International represents the perceptions of entrepreneurs, 
academics and analysts regarding the degree of corruption between public and political 
officials. This index ranges from 0 (maximum corruption) to 100 (minimum 
corruption). On the other hand, the (2) Control of Corruption Index (CC) from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators "captures perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests" (World Bank 2017). This 
index ranges from -2.5 (maximum corruption) to 2.5 (minimum corruption).  
3.1.4 Level of Income (LI) 
The level of income is measured by the log of the Gross Domestic Product per capita in 
PPP (purchasing power parity) in constant 2011 international dollars (GDPpc), as taken 
from the World Bank.  
3.1.5 Freedom of the Press (FP) 
This variable has been measured with an index provided by Freedom House (available 
in Dahlberg et al. 2016) that has been widely used in the literature (see Dutta and Roy 
2016, and the references therein). This index (FP) reflects the political pressures and 
controls on media content and examines “the editorial independence of both state-
owned and privately-owned media; access to information and sources; official 
censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign 
and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the 
intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and 
imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats” (Dahlberg et al. 2016, p. 67). The 
index varies from 0 to 40 where 0 indicates the most freedom. In the estimated model, 
the scale has been inverted in order to obtain results of a more intuitive nature. 
3.2. Epistemic Relationships  
Epistemic relationships describe the link between constructs and indicators. While three 
out of five of our variables of our research model are directly measured by one 
indicator, two key constructs in our study (i.e., tolerance and corruption) are composite 
variables measured by several indicators. In this respect, both tolerance and corruption 
constructs can be considered artefacts, that is, theoretically justified human-made 
constructions (Henseler 2017a). Such artefacts can be regarded as mixtures of elements 
that are combined to form a new object (Nitzl and Chin 2017). On the other hand, 
                                                 
1
 To test the robustness of our results, we have constructed a new index for corruption that includes the 
International Country Risk Guide Index in the indicator as provided by the Political Risk Services Group. 
Since in this case the sample was reduced to 80 countries, it was decided to present the results 
corresponding to a wider sample. 
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Sarstedt et al. (2017) indicate that the presence of artefacts is especially prevalent when 
secondary and archival data are analysed, given that they lack a comprehensive 
substantiation on the grounds of measurement theory. Consequently, both these 
variables have been modelled as composites, which are formed as linear combinations 
of their respective manifest variables (Henseler 2017b).  
3.3. Data analysis 
Component-based structural equation modelling has been applied (Tenenhaus 2008) in 
the form of partial least squares structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM), which is a 
technique for estimating (complex) path models with composites and their relationships. 
Partial least squares path models are defined by two sets of linear equations: the 
measurement model, which describes the link between a construct and its indicators, 
and the structural model, which focuses on the relationships between constructs 
(Henseler 2017b). 
The principal reason for selecting PLS-SEM is that the main constructs included in our 
research model meet the requirements of a composite measurement model (Rigdon 
2012; Sarstedt et al. 2016). In this case, Rigdon (2016) sustains that the PLS path 
modelling estimates are consistent, whilst Sarstedt et al. (2016) show there is no bias. 
Secondly, our choice for PLS-SEM is also due to the use of secondary or archival data, 
since this kind of data typically fails to fulfil the special requirements for covariance-
based SEM (CBSEM) analysis, that is, proportionality constraints on the indicators and 
uncorrelated measurement errors (Gefen et al. 2011; Rigdon 2013). Finally, this 
research employs small sample sizes due to the small population (Richter et al. 2016).  
Thus, PLS will allow us to meet three research purposes (Henseler 2018): (1) 
Explanatory, in order to understand the causal relationships between variables; (2) 
predictive, with the aim to predict values for individual cases; and (3) descriptive, so as 
to generate indices taking into account the nomological net of our research model. This 
study applies SmartPLS 3.2.7 software (Ringle et al. 2015). 
4 Results 
The PLS-SEM evaluation was initially carried out in two stages (Roldán and Sánchez-
Franco 2012): the assessment of the measurement model and that of the structural 
model. We then conducted an evaluation of the predictive performance of the model 
through the use of holdout samples (Shmueli et al. 2016). Finally, the importance-
performance map analysis (IPMA) module was executed (Ringle and Sarstedt 2016) in 
SmartPLS in order to obtain standardized indices for the tolerance and corruption 
variables. 
4.1. Measurement model 
The measurement model evaluation begins by conducting a confirmatory composite 
analysis (Henseler et al. 2014) for the saturated model. This enables the nomological 
(external) validity of the composites to be tested (Henseler 2017a). With this aim in 
mind, the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) index is applied (Hu and 
Bentler 1998), which is considered the dominant approximate model fit criterion 
(Henseler 2017b). Our saturated model achieves an SRMR value of 0.067 (Figure 2) 
which lies below the cut-off value of 0.08 suggested by Hu and Bentler (1999). 
Therefore, this confirmatory composite analysis seems to support the composite model, 
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and composites seem to act within a nomological net rather than as individual indicators 
(Henseler 2017a). 
Since our main constructs (tolerance and corruption) are artefacts, Henseler (2017a) 
argues that indicators of the composites could probably be correlated. Accordingly, we 
have estimated these components in Mode A using correlation weights (Table 2) 
(Rigdon 2016). This means that traditional measures of internal consistency, reliability, 
and validity can be applied (Henseler et al. 2016). In this way, the analysis of individual 
item reliability can be started by evaluating indicator loadings. All indicators for each of 
the two composites have loadings above 0.7. Consequently, individual item reliability is 
considered appropriate (Roldán and Sánchez-Franco 2012) (Table 2). Additionally, both 
components achieve composite reliability (c) figures greater than 0.7 (Table 2), and 
hence these variables are known to have satisfactory construct reliability (Chin 1998). 
The average variance extracted (AVE) is then applied to assess the convergent validity 
(Henseler et al. 2009). Both composites meet this criterion since their AVEs exceed the 
0.5 level (Table 2). Finally, all variables attain discriminant validity. This is achieved by 
applying the Fornell-Larcker (1981) criterion and the strictest Heterotrait-Monotrait 
Ratio (HTMT) of 0.85 criteria (Henseler et al. 2015) (Table 3). This means that each 
variable differs from the other variables. 
INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 
4.2. Structural model 
The assessment of the structural model begins with the evaluation of the SRMR for the 
estimated model (Henseler et al. 2016). Our hypothesized model achieves an SRMR of 
0.069 (Figure 2), which means an adequate fit in accordance with the usual cut-off of 
0.08 (Hu and Bentler 1999). 
Roldán and Sánchez-Franco (2012) suggest assessing the sign, size and significance of 
the structural path coefficients, the f
2
 values, the R
2
 values, and the Q
2
 test for predictive 
relevance. Consistent with Streukens and Leroi-Werelds (2016), bootstrapping (10,000 
bootstrap samples
2
) was used to generate t-statistics and confidence intervals. This 
enables the evaluation of the statistical significance of the path coefficients. The six key 
direct effects, described in Table 4 and Figure 2, are significant. It should be highlighted 
that H1 and H2 (c’) have been supported. In addition, all main direct effects reflect 
major f
2
 values above the medium effect value (0.15) established by Cohen (1988) 
(Table 4). In this way, the effect of level of income on the corruption variable achieves 
an outstandingly meaningful effect (Table 4). Furthermore, the research model seems to 
possess appropriate predictive power (in-sample prediction) for all the endogenous 
variables, especially for the corruption construct (Table 4), which attains the largest 
coefficient of determination (R
2
) (0.811).  
INSERT TABLE 4 
Following the guidelines proposed by Nitzl et al. (2016) and Cepeda, Nitzl and Roldán 
(2017), the mediation hypotheses H3 and H4 have been tested. The indirect effects are 
specified and contrasted through the two mediators: level of income (a1b1) and freedom 
of the press (a2b2) (Table 5), and the direct effect of ethnic fractionalization is 
considered (H1). Additionally, the total (c) and direct (H2: c’) effects of the exogenous 
construct (i.e., tolerance) on the endogenous variable (i.e., corruption) have been 
                                                 
2
 Every bootstrap sample contains the same number of cases as the original sample (n = 86).  
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assessed by taking the influence of ethnic fractionalization into account. The 
bootstrapping procedure has been chosen to test the indirect effects using the percentile 
confidence intervals. As Table 5 shows, tolerance (c) and ethnic fractionalization 
present significant total effects on corruption. When mediators are introduced (Fig. 2), 
ethnic fractionalization and tolerance maintain a significant level of direct effects on 
corruption (H1 and H2: c’). Accordingly, H1 and H2 are supported. On the other hand, 
all the indirect effects from tolerance on corruption are significant (Table 5). This means 
that H3 and H4 are supported. This study shows that the level of income mediates the 
relationship between tolerance and corruption (H3: a1b1). At the same time, Table 5 
describes how freedom of the press mediates the path between tolerance and corruption 
(H4: a2b2). Therefore, this means that the level of income and freedom of the press 
partially mediate the influence of tolerance on corruption. This conclusion is also 
achieved by calculating the variance accounted for (VAF) index (Hair et al. 2017), 
which determines the size of the indirect effect in relation to the total effect. A typical 
partial mediation case can be found when the VAF is greater than 20 percent and less 
than 80 percent. This situation occurs when the total indirect effect of tolerance on 
corruption is assessed (VAF = 59.1%), (Table 5). Finally, it can be observed that the 
direct effect (c’= -0.246) of tolerance on corruption is smaller than the total indirect 
effect (a1b1 + a2b2 = -0.356) through mediators (level of income and freedom of the 
press) (Table 5).  
INSERT TABLE 5
 
Fig. 2 Model of the relationship between tolerance and corruption: Empirical results  
 
4.3. Predictive performance of the model using holdout samples 
*** p < 0.001 (based on t(9999), one-tailed test)
+++ p < 0.001, ns: not significant (based on t(9999), two-tailed test)
Estimated model: SRMR = 0.069; Saturated model: SRMR = 0.067
a1 = 0.430***
a2 = 0.496*** b2 = -0.371***
b1 = -0.400***
H2(-) = c’ = -0.246***
H3(-) = Tolerance à Level of income à Corruption = a1b1
H4(-) = Tolerance à Freedom of the press à Corruption = a2b2
Tolerance
Level of
income
R2 = 0.215
Freedom of the 
press
R2 = 0.391
Corruption
R2 = 0.811
Ethnic 
fractionalization
-0.096ns
H1(+) = 
0.188***
-0.276+++
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The predictive performance of a model refers to its ability to predict accurate values for 
individual cases (Evermann and Tate 2016). Following Shmueli et al. (2016), the 
predictive performance of our research model (out-of-sample prediction) has been 
assessed using cross-validation with holdout samples. The PLS predict algorithm in the 
SmartPLS software has therefore been employed in order to generate k-fold cross-
validated prediction errors and prediction error summary statistics to assess the 
predictive performance of our model for the indicators and the constructs. For these 
statistics, the Q² value (SmartPLS 2017) in PLS Predict has been used (Table 6). When 
the Q² value is positive, then the prediction error of the PLS-SEM results is smaller than 
the prediction error produced when only the mean values are used. Accordingly, our 
model reflects a satisfactory predictive performance at the level of the main endogenous 
construct (corruption), and at its indicator level (Table 6). Evidence has therefore been 
found that shows our model has sufficient predictive power to predict values for new 
cases for the corruption variable. In addition, this means that the antecedent variables in 
our model can predict the corruption variable in additional samples that are separate 
from the dataset used to test the theoretical research model (Woodside 2013), which 
implies additional support for the research model assessed in this study. 
INSERT TABLE 6 
4.4. Index generation for tolerance and corruption variables  
This study uses the importance-performance map analysis (IPMA) option included in 
the SmartPLS 3 software in order to obtain indices for tolerance and corruption 
constructs, which constitute the two key composites included in this research. The 
IPMA is a useful tool that combines the analysis of the importance and performance 
dimensions of constructs in explaining other latent variables in a structural model 
(Ringle and Sarstedt 2016). In this vein, IPMA rescales the standardized construct 
scores, initially generated by the PLS algorithm, on a range from 0 to 100, thereby 
allowing an easy interpretation of the data. This enables indices for tolerance and 
corruption for each country included in our sample to be generated. Both indices vary 
from 0 to 100, where a score of 100 indicates the highest level for each of the above-
mentioned variables (see Table A2 in the Appendix).  
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
1. This research develops a new country-level measure of tolerance towards immigrants 
and people of different race for 86 countries (Table A2 in the Appendix). We have 
jointly exploited several sources of information for the creation of this index: World 
Value Survey, European Value Survey and Index Tolerance for Immigrants produced 
by the Social Progress Imperative from the Gallup World Poll. Likewise, we have 
combined the items of these surveys that ask about aspects of tolerance linked to this 
attitude towards immigrants and people of other races. This has enabled the diverse 
dimensions of a complex phenomenon that is not directly observable to be taken into 
account. It is important to analyse the various dimensions in which tolerance can be 
manifested since, being a socially acceptable value in many territories, partial 
observations can lead us to overestimate the phenomenon. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are no indices of this nature available in the 
literature. Most of the previous empirical research has used values of a single item as 
proxy to measure tolerance. The few global indices of tolerance constructed hitherto 
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constitute indices of social tolerance in the broad sense, in that they combine the same 
item of tolerance but ask about different social groups. There are no composite indices 
of tolerance towards a specific social group that have been constructed in a similar way 
to that presented in the current work for immigrants and people of other races. 
This new measure enables countries to be classified according to their levels of 
tolerance to immigrants and people of other races. Those countries with the highest 
levels of tolerance include Sweden, Norway, and Denmark; at the other extreme we find 
Vietnam, Indonesia, and Iran. The results for the highest levels are very similar to those 
of other global indices of social tolerance (Berggren and Nilsson 2013; Das et al. 2008), 
and we have found greater differences in the lower levels (e.g. the index built by Das et 
al. (2008) places Iran in the 15th position out of a total of 62 countries, and Vietnam in 
the 39th position). Moreover, we are surprised by the result achieved by Berggren and 
Nilsson 2013 for New Zealand, since they rank it 57th out of 61 while in our study it 
reaches the 8th position out of 86. 
2. On the other hand, we have built a new corruption index (Table A2 in the Appendix) 
combining the Perception Corruption Index of Transparency International and the 
Control Corruption Index from the World Bank, which allows a greater number of 
aspects related to corruption to be collected. According to this new index, Denmark, 
New Zealand and Sweden are the countries with the lowest values of corruption, while 
Libya, Zimbabwe and Uzbekistan have the highest levels. 
3. Taking advantage of the capability of generating latent variable scores offered by 
Partial Least Squares (Yoon and Klasen 2017), indices for tolerance and corruption 
have been attained. In particular, the importance-performance map analysis (IPMA) 
functionality has been applied in order to obtain standardized construct scores rescaled 
on a range from 0 to 100 (Table A2 in the Appendix). 
4. The structural model tested in this work corroborates the existence of a positive and 
significant association between fractionalization and corruption (H1) (Figure 2, Table 
4). This result is in line with previous studies (Alesina et al. 2003; Huntington 1968; La 
Porta et al. 1999; Mauro 1995; Nissan and Naghshpour 2013; Papyrakis and Mo 2014). 
5. Nevertheless, the findings presented here provide strong evidence that the adverse 
effect of ethnic fractionalization on corruption can be overcome when tolerance is taken 
into account (the total effect of tolerance on corruption is both negative and significant: 
see Table 5). 
In fact, a first glance at the data shows, for example, that countries with low levels of 
corruption, such as Canada and, to a lesser extent, Switzerland and Luxemburg, not only 
present a relatively high level of fractionalization but also high levels of tolerance. By 
contrast, both fractionalization and tolerance are low in Japan, but its corruption index is 
higher in comparison with countries with similar economic features. 
In this respect, we have found evidence that the size of the effect that tolerance exerts 
upon corruption is much higher than the effect that fractionalization has on corruption (-
0.246 directly and -0.356 indirectly versus 0.188 from ethnic fractionalization: see 
Table 5). This result supports that tolerance can largely compensate for the adverse 
effects that diversity could generate, which may provide major practical implications for 
governments, especially those with high levels of fractionalization. 
The inclusion of the role of tolerance as a determinant of corruption constitutes an 
innovative contribution to the literature.   
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6. We have also found that the total effect of tolerance on corruption has both a direct 
component (H2) and an indirect component through income level (H3) and the freedom 
of the press (H4). The empirical analysis carried out supports the set of hypotheses 
(Table 5). The direct relationships between the variables considered and corruption is 
negative and significant (Table 4). Likewise, the results indicate that the set of indirect 
effects (a1b1 + a2b2 = -0.356) is (in absolute value) higher than the (absolute value of) 
direct effect (c’= -0.246). Therefore, although tolerance itself can translate into lower 
levels of corruption, if it also leads to higher levels of income and more freedom of the 
press, then the decline in corruption could be even greater. On the other hand, the 
indirect effect through the freedom of the press (a2b2 = -0.184) is (in absolute value) 
slightly higher than the absolute value of the level of income (a1b1 = -0.172) (Table 5). 
Moreover, these results indicate that both the direct effect and the indirect effects 
considered in isolation are able to offset the detrimental effect of ethnic fractionalization 
on corruption. 
Both the level of income and freedom of the press partially mediate the relationship 
between tolerance and corruption. In this respect, our results in Figure 2 coincide with 
those in the previous literature.  The positive relationship between tolerance and income 
level (a1) is found by Berggren and Elinder (2012a, 2012b), Das et al. (2008), Florida 
(2002, 2003, 2014), Florida and Tinagli (2004), and by Gani (2016). With respect to 
tolerance and freedom of the press (a2), our results are in line with those of Sandoval 
and Collins (2016). As far as corruption and income level is concerned (b1), the 
relationship between the two variables is well established in the literature: see Saha and 
Ali (2017), Treisman (2007), and the references therein. Furthermore, in the same way 
as Adsera et al. (2003), Brunetti and Weder (2003), Dutta and Roy (2016), Pellegrini 
(2011), and Treisman (2007), we also find that the freedom of the press helps fight 
against corruption (b2). 
7. Finally, the predictive effect of the designed model has been verified (Table 6), which 
suggests that we could predict new cases for the corruption variable based on new data 
for the four antecedent variables of our model, that is to say, tolerance, level of income, 
freedom of the press, and ethnic fractionalization.  
6. Implications and limitations 
Interesting theoretical and practical implications can be drawn from the results of this 
work. 
From the theoretical point of view, empirical evidence has been found that tolerance 
could be considered as a determinant of corruption, whereby the sign of this relationship 
is negative. The association between these two variables occurs both directly and 
indirectly through income levels and the freedom of the press. These findings can 
complete the models that explain corruption. 
On the other hand, the current study expands the scientific literature on the implications 
of tolerance. Although there are numerous theoretical and empirical studies that analyse 
the effects of tolerance on economic development, we cannot find any studies that 
analyse the relationships between tolerance and the quality of institutions. 
Likewise, major practical implications can be drawn from the results of this work, in 
particular for the governmental management of social diversity. Globalization and 
growing migratory flows are making current societies more diverse. Various studies 
have shown that these changes, although they could generate significant benefits for the 
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economies and host societies, could also translate into lower levels of institutional 
quality. 
This paper finds that tolerance plays a key role in overcoming the adverse effects that 
ethnic heterogeneity could have on corruption. Based on this result, governments should 
design and implement measures to promote tolerance. In this sense, on the one hand, 
from a macroeconomic point of view, the education system plays a key role, so it should 
be analysed how to approach this issue from primary education to university studies. On 
the other hand, from a microeconomic perspective, local policies are a relevant element 
since they allow specific integration actions to be carried out, especially in those 
territories with high diversity indices. 
In the current context, in which nationalism is re-emerging and xenophobic political 
parties, which seek limitations on migratory flows, are growing, it is crucial to develop 
scientific studies that demonstrate how the potential adverse effects of social diversity 
can be overcome. In this work, we have provided empirical evidence that tolerance can 
be an effective instrument to achieve this objective. In addition, although tolerance itself 
is an element that can lead to a reduction of corruption, if this tolerance translates into 
higher levels of income and into more freedom of the press, then the reduction in levels 
of corruption could be even greater. 
Finally, the new indices constructed in this work can be useful for governments to 
monitor the evolution both of corruption and of tolerance towards immigrants and 
people of another race. Possessing reliable measuring instruments is essential for the 
correct diagnosis of economic and social problems, which, in turn, is the key to finding 
effective solutions. 
Further research is required to provide an in-depth analysis of the determinants of 
tolerance in order to give precise recommendations that help societies to be more 
tolerant and respectful towards diversity. Likewise, the analysis carried out in this paper 
could be extended in several directions. First, the tolerance indices referring to other 
elements of social tolerance, such as tolerance towards people of different languages, 
religions, and sexual orientation, could be developed. Second, we have focused only on 
corruption as one of the main components of the quality of institutions, despite the fact 
that there are several elements, such as democracy and rule of law, that are also relevant 
dimensions of the quality of institutions. Third, it would be interesting to disaggregate 
the national level into regional and local levels in order to focus on those regions of 
least tolerance. 
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Table 1 Data description and sources  
Name Variable Index/Description Source 
CORRUPTION (C):   
- CC Control of 
Corruption 
Perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests. 
World Bank 
- CPI Corruption 
Perception  
Index 
Synthetic index (combination of surveys 
and assessments) that measures 
perceptions about corruption in the public 
sector. 
Transparency 
International 
TOLERANCE (T):   
- VCHILD Children values % mentioned Item v16 WVS:  
“Qualities that children can be 
encouraged to learn at home (choose up 
to five-v12 to v22-): v16. Tolerance and 
respect for other people” 
World Value Survey 
(waves 5 and 6) 
European Value Survey 
(wave 4) 
- VNEIGHRACE Tolerance towards 
other races 
% no mentioned Item v37 WVS:  
“Could you please mention any that you 
would not like to have as neighbours? 
(v36-v44): v37. People of a different 
race” 
World Value Survey 
(waves 5 and 6) 
European Value Survey 
(wave 4) 
- VNEIGHINMIG Tolerance towards 
immigrants 
% no mentioned Item v39 WVS:  
“Could you please mention any that you 
would not like to have as neighbours? 
(v36-v44): v39. Immigrants/foreign 
workers” 
World Value Survey 
(waves 5 and 6) 
European Value Survey 
(wave 4) 
- VPRIORITY Immigrant job Sum % disagree or neither Item v46 
WVS:  “When jobs are scarce, employers 
should give priority to people of this 
country over immigrants” 
World Value Survey 
(waves 5 and 6) 
European Value Survey 
(wave 4) 
- TOLINMIG Index tolerance for 
immigrants 
Is the city or area where you live a good 
place or not a good place to live for 
immigrants from other countries? 
Social Progress Index 
(Gallup World Poll) 
LEVEL OF INCOME (LI):  
GDP per capita in PPP in constant 2011 
international dollars 
 
World Development 
Indicator (World Bank) 
- GDPpc  
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (FP):  
Reflects the political pressures and 
controls on media content 
 
Freedom House - FP  
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION (EF):  
The probability that two randomly 
selected people from a given country will 
not belong to the same ethno-linguistic 
group 
 
Alesina et al. (2003) - EF  
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Table 2 Measurement model results 
Construct / Indicator Loadings Weights c AVE 
Tolerance (estimated in Mode A) 
  
0.865 0.562 
VCHILD 0.719 0.305 
  VNEIGHRACE 0.787 0.281 
  VNEIGHINMIG 0.727 0.180 
  VPRIORITY 0.739 0.283 
  TOLERINM 0.772 0.285 
Level of income 
  
n.a. n.a. 
GDPpc 1 1 
  Freedom of the press 
  
n.a. n.a. 
FP 1 1 
  Corruption (estimated in Mode A) 
  
0.999 0.998 
CC 0.999 0.500 
  CPI 0.999 0.502 
  Ethnic fractionalization 
  
n.a. n.a. 
EF 1 1 
  
Notes: c: Composite reliability. AVE: Average variance extracted.  
 
Table 3. Measurement model. Discriminant validity 
Fornell-Larcker Criterion 
 
Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) 
 
T LI FP C   EF 
 
T LI FP C EF 
T 0.749 
     
T 
     LI 0.454 n.a. 
    
LI 0.469 
    FP 0.566 0.386 n.a. 
   
FP 0.631 0.386 
   C -0.685 -0.693 -0.740 0.999 
  
C 0.741 0.694 0.741 
  EF -0.252 -0.204 -0.401 0.480 n.a. 
 
EF 0.284 0.204 0.401 0.481 
 
Notes: T: Tolerance; LI: Level of income; FP: Freedom of the press; C: Corruption; EF: Ethnic fractionalization. 
Fornell-Larcker Criterion: Diagonal elements (bold) are the square root of the variance shared between the constructs 
and their measures (average variance extracted). Off-diagonal elements are the correlations between constructs. For 
discriminant validity, diagonal elements should be larger than off-diagonal elements. n.a.: Non-applicable. 
 
 
Table 4. Effects on endogenous variables 
 
Direct 
effect t-value p-value PCI 
Explained 
variance f2 
Level of income (R2 = 0.215) 
      Tolerance (a1) 0.430 5.887 0.000 [0.326; 0.568] Sig. 19.5% 0.220 
CV: Ethnic fractionalization -0.096 0.720 0.471 [-0.384; 0.126] N.Sig. 2.0% 0.011 
Freedom of the press (R2 = 0.391) 
      Tolerance (a2) 0.496 5.772 0.000 [0.352; 0.663] Sig. 28.1% 0.379 
CV: Ethnic fractionalization -0.276 3.365 0.001 [-0.433; -0.113] Sig. 11.1% 0.117 
Corruption (R2 = 0.811) 
      H1(+): Ethnic fractionalization 0.188 3.317 0.000 [0.090; 0.273] Sig. 9.0% 0.157 
H2(-): Tolerance (c') -0.246 3.927 0.000 [-0.350; -0.144] Sig. 16.9% 0.197 
Level of income (b1) -0.400 5.383 0.000 [-0.526; -0.282] Sig. 27.7% 0.650 
Freedom of the press (b2) -0.371 5.317 0.000 [-0.475; -0.246] Sig. 27.5% 0.433 
Notes: PCI: Percentile confidence interval. Bootstrapping based on n = 10,000 bootstrap samples. CV: Control 
variable. Paths from hypothesized effects are assessed by applying a one-tailed test for a t Student distribution (PCI 
90%). Effects from the control variable are assessed by applying a two-tailed test (PCI 95%). Sig. denotes a 
significant direct effect; N.Sig. denotes a non-significant direct effect.  
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Table 5 Summary of mediating effect test 
Total effect on Corruption 
 
Direct effects on Corruption 
 
Indirect effects of Tolerance on Corruption 
         
Point PCI 
  
 
Path p-value 
  
Path p-value 
  
estimate Lower Upper Sig. VAF 
T (c) -0.605 0.000 
 
H2(-): T (c') -0.246 0.000 
 
H3(-): a1b1 (via LI) -0.172 -0.246 -0.120 Yes 28.6% 
EF 0.326 0.000 
 
H1(+): EF 0.188 0.000 
 
H4(-): a2b2 (via FP) -0.184 -0.251 -0.113 Yes 30.6% 
        
Total = a1b1 + a2b2 -0.356 -0.448 -0.271 Yes 59.1% 
Notes: PCI: Percentile confidence interval. Bootstrapping based on n = 10,000 bootstrap samples. T: Tolerance; LI: 
Level of income; FP: Freedom of the press; EF: Ethnic fractionalization. Paths from hypothesized effects are assessed 
by applying a one-tailed test for a t Student distribution (PCI 90%). Sig. denotes a significant direct effect. VAF: 
Variance accounted for. 
 
Table 6 Predictive performance assessment 
Construct prediction summary Q2 
Corruption 0.603 
Indicator prediction summary 
 CC 0.543 
CPI 0.538 
Notes: CC: Control of Corruption. CPI: Corruption Perception Index 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. Observations 
LI (GDPpc) 24841.53 132467.62 1247.18 21647.98 86 
FP (FP) 17.55 37.92 4.08 9.71 86 
EF (EF) 0.40 0.85 0.00 0.24 86 
CC 0.31 2.38 -1.41 1.07 86 
CPI 50.12 91.98 16.85 21.35 86 
VCHILD 68.36 91.70 36.10 12.67 86 
VNEIGHRACE 82.79 99.00 44.90 11.31 86 
VNEIGHINMIG 78.26 97.35 41.00 13.65 86 
VPRIORITY 30.50 85.80 4.50 16.28 86 
TOLINMG 0.59 0.89 0.19 0.16 86 
Corruption  54.69 99.71 0.00 28.30 86 
Tolerance 57.54 96.10 31.81 16.71 86 
Notes: The descriptive statistics have been constructed for the original values of the variables [LI (Level of income), 
FP (Freedom of the press), EF (Ethnic fractionalization)] and the items used in obtaining the indices of Corruption 
and Tolerance, (i.e. CC and CPI for the former, and VCHILD, VNEIGHRACE, VNEIGHINMIG, VPRIORITY and 
TOLINMG for the latter). See Section 3.1.  
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Table A2 Corruption and Tolerance Indices. Data base 
  Corruption Tolerance  Corruption Tolerance 
Albania
(3)
 79.25 38.11 Kyrgyzstan
(1)
 92.07 48.38 
Armenia
(1)(3)
 77.16 39.01 Latvia
(3)
 57.19 47.15 
Australia
(1)(2)
 11.34 87.08 Libya
(1)
 99.71 34.94 
Austria
(3)
 24.09 61.34 Lithuania
(3)
 53.75 39.59 
Azerbaijan
(1)(3)
 89.84 33.72 Luxemburg
(3)
 7.71 80.70 
Bahrain
(1)
 54.38 45.60 Malaysia
(1)(2)
 55.90 38.17 
Belarus
(1)(3)
 78.27 47.76 Mali
(2)
 81.13 53.16 
Belgium
(3)
 21.93 79.86 Malta
(3)
 39.86 42.23 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
(3)
 70.50 49.53 Mexico
(1)(2)
 75.65 66.97 
Brazil
(1) (2)
 65.31 66.99 Moldova. Republic of
(2)
 80.93 49.74 
Bulgaria
(2)
 69.44 43.17 Morocco
(1)(2)
 71.61 47.68 
Burkina Faso
(2)
 75.41 68.35 Netherlands
(1)(2)
 7.59 81.99 
Canada
(2)
 11.51 87.25 New Zealand
(1)(2)
 1.23 85.00 
Chile
(1) (2)
 23.27 73.35 Nigeria
(1)
 92.59 53.66 
China
(1) (2)
 74.76 52.19 Norway
(2)
 4.94 91.63 
Colombia
(1)(2)
 73.31 76.78 Pakistan
(1)
 88.58 47.82 
Croatia
(3)
 61.68 55.52 Peru
(1)(2)
 72.96 62.85 
Cyprus
(1)(2)
 34.47 51.75 Philippines
(1)
 78.37 52.90 
Czech Republic
(3)
 56.25 35.53 Poland
(1)(2)
 48.69 63.21 
Denmark
(3)
 0.00 91.28 Portugal
(3)
 37.56 68.91 
Ecuador
(1)
 82.39 48.43 Qatar
(1)
 30.12 60.81 
Estonia
(1)(3)
 35.59 49.12 Romania
(1)(2)
 67.99 52.56 
Ethiopia
(2)
 78.46 48.19 Russian Federation
(1)(2)
 88.88 48.74 
Finland
(2)
 4.61 76.13 Rwanda
(1)(2)
 47.88 53.12 
France
(2)
 26.47 69.13 Singapore
(1)
 6.37 52.45 
Gabon
(2)
 80.05 51.67 Slovakia
(3)
 59.27 42.92 
Georgia
(1)(3)
 56.81 41.14 Slovenia
(1)(2)
 42.03 65.06 
Germany
(1)(2)
 16.35 72.20 South Africa
(2)
 64.34 62.47 
Ghana
(1)(2)
 64.32 52.68 Spain
(1)(2)
 39.44 77.19 
Greece
(3)
 67.95 54.31 Sweden
(1)(2)
 3.38 96.10 
Guatemala
(2)
 78.07 58.28 Switzerland
(2)
 6.91 85.13 
Hungary
(1)(2)
 55.93 55.13 Thailand
(1)(2)
 71.92 34.91 
Iceland
(3)
 13.04 85.14 Macedonia
(3)
 62.88 43.54 
India
(1)(2)
 76.75 38.84 Trinidad And Tobago
(1)(2)
 72.69 74.16 
Indonesia
(2)
 80.08 31.95 Turkey
(1)(2)
 61.44 46.05 
Iran. Islamic Republic of
(2)
 84.11 32.24 Ukraine
(1)(2)
 89.51 48.48 
Ireland
(3)
 21.70 65.85 United Kingdom
(2)
 19.75 81.82 
Italy
(2)
 63.67 67.32 United States of America
(1)(2)
 28.28 75.53 
Japan
(1)(2)
 20.03 48.74 Uruguay
(1)(2)
 28.49 79.71 
Jordan
(1)(2)
 60.27 35.11 Uzbekistan
(1)
 95.41 73.52 
Kazakhstan
(1)
 86.33 49.35 Vietnam
(2)
 78.15 31.81 
Korea. Republic of
(1)(2)
 50.25 33.66 Zambia
(2)
 74.41 44.00 
Kuwait
(1)
 63.03 52.14 Zimbabwe
(1)
 97.59 60.37 
Notes: (1) Data from WVS 6 (2010-2014). (2) Data from WVS 5 (2005-2009). (3) Data from EVS 4 (2008-2010). The 
descriptive statistic for both indices appears in Table A1. 
 
